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Abstract
Signal Processing in Encrypted Domain (SPED) is a blending of signal processing and cryptography. SPED is a magniﬁcent tool
for processing encrypted data. It provides privacy and security for highly conﬁdential and sensitive data. In this paper we propose a
system model for speech authentication, where authentication is done on cipher speech rather than raw speech in the data set. Here
we have tested the proposed system with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ciphers and Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA)
ciphers with secure signal processing protocols like Secure Inner Product (SIP) and Secure Log Sum (SLS). The test results with
AES ciphers and RSA ciphers with secure authentication protocols SIP and SIS are detailed in this paper. The experimental result
shows that the SLS protocol works well for speech authentication irrespective of the encryption schemes and the feature selection.
The performance of the system is evaluated using False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) measures.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016.
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1. Introduction
Due to the rapid technological developments in the areas like social networking, online applications, cloud com-
puting, and distributed processing, in general, have raised important concerns regarding the security and privacy but
user related content. Use of biometric template for personal recognition1 has been proved eﬃcient and practical, but
it raises several privacy issues. In particular, biometrics cannot be considered as secret data, biometric data are almost
not revocable due to their permanent nature, whereas they are unique and can be used to identify someone among a
large set of individuals.
Public environment is required to storing private data, but there are many security issues. To overcome this chal-
lenges we go for SPED, where the data is processed directly in the encrypted domain. Homomorphic encryption is
an approach, in general, used to process data in encrypted domain. In 1978 Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzous3 intro-
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duced privacy homomorphism. In this method homomorphism is used along with encryption,which has many security
issues. In 1978 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) proposed4 a public key cryptosystem, it is a multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption scheme. In RSA, multiplications can be performed with the encrypted data without decrypting the
data. Goldwasser-Micali and Elgamal5 developed semantically secure additive homomorphic encryption scheme in
1985. Benaloh6 scheme in 1988 is a generalization of Goldwasser-Micalli method. Naccache Stern7 scheme achives
smaller expansion of plaintext and thereby achives superior eﬃciency. Pascal Paillier7 introduced additive homomor-
phic encryption scheme in 1999. It is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography.
In 2009 Craig Gentry8 proposed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. It is the ﬁrst encryption scheme to
provide unlimited number of addition and multiplication on ciphertext. The fully homomorhic encryption scheme
is developed from somewhat homomomorphic encryption scheme. When homomorphic operation is applied on ci-
phertext, noise assosciated with it increases. When noise reaches a particular level the resulting ciphertext cannot
be able to decrypt correctly. All existing fully homomorphic encryption schemes were developed from the Gentry’s
method. In 2010, Martin Van Dijik, Craig Gentry, Shai Haveli and Vinod Vaikndanathan9 developed a second fully
homomorphic encryption scheme, which was an Integer based method deals with modular arithmetic operations. In
2012, Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry and Vinod Vaikundanathan9 developed a eﬃcient somewhat and fully homo-
morphic cryptosystems, referred as second generation fully homomorhic encryption scheme. This method is based
on learn with errors, having slower growth of noise during the homomorphic operations. Software library HELib9 for
implementing homomorphic encryption was developed by IBM in 2013. Homomorphic Encryption is one of the most
relevant types of encryption methods studied in the computational sciences today. All the techniques including fully,
somewhat, and partially homomorphic encryption allows one to securely transmit, store, and process encrypted data
without jeopardizing the conﬁdentiality of data. The area of homomorphic cryptography remains an interesting area
with a lot of scope for future research.
When considering biometric data, if the biometric templates were stolen, they may be used for illegal activities.
In 2011, Sony′s playstation1was hacked and the personal information of users were leaked and also discovered that
Dropbox was storing user ﬁles in unencrypted format. These are motivations to prevent someone from learning the
content of a remote database. SPED is the general signal processing tools that work directly on encrypted data, rep-
resenting a valid solution for processing sensitive data by the third party. Processing signals in encrypted domain is
an important challenge. Though many algorithms were developed based on homomorphic encryption schemes, the
practical implementations of such schemes still remain a challenge. Hence new eﬃcient and less complex homomor-
phic encryption based approaches can be developed for signal processing applications like privacy preserving speech
processing and privacy preserving biometric authentication.
In this paper we deal with speech biometric data. The main objective of this paper is to devolop a system model
which will process the encrypted biometric signal in the encrypted domain while maintaining the biometric template
protection, and store biometric template in encrypted domain.The main application of speech authentication is call
steering, call centre authentication etc. Our contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
• The existing works doesn’t provides any real time implementation of homomorphic encryption for biometric
system. Here we propose a new system model for secure biometric authentication.
• We propose a new secure speech authentication system, in which the features of the biometric data are encrypted
using AES and RSA schemes and authentication is done using secure primitives like secure inner product and
secure log sum. The proposed system is evaluated using False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate
(FRR) measures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the proposed system model for privacy preserving speech
processing is detailed, the secure signal processing approaches are given in section 3. The performance measures are
explained in section 4. Implementation and simulation results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 respectively
and the conclusion in Section 7.
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2. System Model
Speech is one of the most simplest private forms of personal communication, speech sample contains information
about the gender, accent and the emotional state of the speaker apart from the message content. This paper focusses
on developing a privacy preserving speech veriﬁcation framework. In this proposed method the system stores only
encrypted speech samples of a speaker and it is used to authenticate the user. A generalized block diagram for
privacy preserving speech processing is shown in Fig.1. Various steps in the privacy preserving speech processing
are feature extraction, encoding, hashing, encryption, secure computations for authentication, compare with threshold
and decision making.
Fig. 1. Proposed system model
2.1. Feature extraction
To represent speech signals more compact and eﬃcient, we go for best feature extraction models. In this case, we
perform Mel Frequency Cepstral Coeeﬁcients (MFCC) and Perceptial Linear Prediction (PLP).
2.1.1. Mel Frequency Cepstral Coeeﬁcients (MFCC)
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coeeﬁcient18 extract features according to human perception. Humans are less sensitive
to frequency above 1KHz. Mel scale is linear up to 1 KHz and then varies logarithmically. Frequency to mel scale
conversion is given in equation 1, where f is frequency in hertz.
m = 2595 ∗ log10(1 + f /700) (1)
The cepstral representation of speech provides characteristics of local spectrum.
2.1.2. Perceptial Linear Prediction (PLP)
PLP models the auditory systems spectrum using the autocorrelation linear prediction system. Main two treads in-
volved in this method is obtaining auditory spectrum and approximating the auditory spectrum by an all pole model21.
Auditory spectrum is derived from the speech waveform by critical-band ﬁltering, equal loudness curve pre−emphasis,
and intensity loudness root compression. Eighteen critical band ﬁlter outputs with their center frequencies equally
spaced in bark domain, are deﬁned in equation 2, where w is the angular frequency in rad/s.
Ω(w) = 6 ∗ ln((w/1200 ∗ π) + ((w/1200 ∗ π)2 + 1)1/2) (2)
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2.2. Encoding
Analog transmission is much eﬀected by noise. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) is the technique used here to
digitalize the samples. Levels of quantization is given in equation 3.
L = 2n (3)
Continuous samples are rounded oﬀ and truncated in to a ﬁnite range of discrete values. Discrete samples are repre-
sented in binary numbers having the range from 0 to n, where n is in powers of 2.
2.3. Hashing
A widely used cryptographic hash function to produce a message digest of 128 bit. The structure of this hash
function is taken from Markle−Damgard construction. Three helper function involved .i.e. buﬀer, table and auxiliary
function.
Ki = abs(sin(i + 1)) ∗ 232 ∗ A (4)
Table is used for improving computational speed. Total of 64 elements are inside it, each element is represented by
equation 4.
2.4. Encryption
This paper mainly focused on AES and RSA cryptosystems. We use 128 bit standards, where the input to these
encryption schemes is 128 bit. AES is a symmetric encryption scheme, here 128 bit plaintext converted into 128 bit
ciphertext. Key sizes used by AES is 128, 192 and 256 bits17, having 10 rounds of operation, each round carrying
four operations except for the last round all other rounds are identical. The four operations are substitute bytes, shift
rows, mix columns and add roundkey. RSA is an asymmetric key cryptosystem, it uses both public and private keys.
RSA′s key size varies from 1024 to 4096 and it having a single round of operations. Each round involves four steps:
key generation, key distribution, encryption and decryption. Public key (e, n) used for encryption, alike that a private
key (d, n) is used for decryption.
2.5. Secure signal processing
To enable computations on highly conﬁdential and sensitive data, i.e., to work directly on the encrypted data, we
go for the secure signal processing approaches. Public key homomorphic encryption schemes, which enables some
operations on the encrypted data. Complex mathematical operations can be done on the encrypted data without ef-
fecting the nature of the encryption. Homomorphic encryption consists of four functions; KeyGen, Encrypt, Evaluate
and Decrypt. When decrypt the result of the evaluation algorithm, it gives the same result as if what operations done
on the plaintext.
Various ﬂavors of secure primitives for speech processing are secure inner product16, secure log sum, secure
maximum value, secure maximum index14 etc. In this work we focused mainly on secure inner product (SIP) and
secure log sum (SLS) protocols, it is shown in Table 1.
3. Secure Protocols
3.1. Secure inner product
Alice holds vector v and Bob vector w both lies in Rd−1, where d ≥ 3. Alice is interested in computing wT .vwithout
revealing anything about her vector16. Bob is willing to participate in such a protocol as long as he does not reveal
more than the dotproduct to Alice. Q is random s× s matrix, s ≥ 2 where s is the security parameter. Randomly select
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Table 1. Seure primitives utilized in this work
Primitives and Inputs Output:Alice Output:Bob Relation
SIP(x,y) a b a+b=xT y
SLS(x,y) a b a+b=ln
∑d
i=1 xi + yi
r,R1,R2, andR3, where 1 ≤ r ≤ s. Choose s − 1 random d × 1 vectors, xi where 1 ≤ i ≤ s, i  r.w′ is vector in Rd for
which w
′
i = wi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1 , andw
′
d = 1. Set xr = w
′
and create an s × d matrix X, its ith row is xTi 13.
b =
s∑
i=1
= Qir (5)
c =
s∑
i=1,ir
(xTi ∗
s∑
j=1
Qji) (6)
Bob chooses a random 1×d vector f,
Q ∗ X (7)
c
′
= c + f T ∗ R1 ∗ R2 (8)
g = f ∗ R1 ∗ R3 (9)
v
′
be in Rd such that v
′
i = vi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, and v
′
d = α, where α is a random number.
y = Q ∗ X ∗ v′ (10)
z =
s∑
i=1
= yi (11)
a = z − c′ ∗ v′ (12)
Sends a to Bob and computes,
h = gT ∗ v′ (13)
β = (a + h ∗ R2/R3)/B (14)
Send β to Alice and dotproduct is ﬁnally obtained as β − α.
3.2. Secure log sum
Alice and Bob wish to obtain uninformative additive shares, a and b such that a + b = ln(Σdi=1zi) which is the log
sum operation that gives the protocol its name. We note that and achieve the desired secret sharing using the following
protocol20,
1. Alice chooses a at random. Then Alice and Bob compute additive shares q, s such that q + s = S IP(ex−a, ey)
using the SIP protocol above. Bob combines these shares to obtain the inner product φ.
2. Bob computes b = lnφ = −a + ln(Σdi=1exi+yi) = −a + ln(Σdi=1zi) which gives the desired result.
In the ﬁrst step above, Alice and Bob employ additive secret sharing in the exponent, which is equivalent to multi-
plicative secret sharing. The parameter a should be chosen large enough because multiplicative secret sharing is not as
secure as standard additive secret sharing. We present this protocol to illuminate the fact that homomorphic functions
can be manipulated to compute non obvious functions. The same functionality can be obtained in a secure manner
using other cryptographic primitives. To refer this protocol, it will state that Alice and Bob obtain additive shares20
a, b such that a + b = S LOG(lnz).
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Table 2. Simulation results
Speech 1 Speech 2 AES RSA
MFCC PLP MFCC PLP
SIP SLS SIP SLS SIP SLS SIP SLS
one1 one1 0.85 0.61 0.88 0.69 0.89 0.91 0.98 0.87
one1 one3 0.86 0.67 0.83 0.68 0.83 0.89 1 0.91
two1 two3 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.83 1 0.88 0.89 1
two1 two2 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.89 0.98
three1 three2 0.98 0.54 0.76 0.84 0.50 0.79 0.82 0.87
four1 four4 0.66 0.66 0.79 0.69 0.99 0.89 0.79 0..98
ﬁve1 ﬁve3 0.79 0.55 0.91 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.77 0.98
ﬁve1 ﬁve2 0.79 0.69 0.89 0.87 0.54 0.61 0.72 0.95
one2 one1 0.92 0.99 1 0.83 0.87 0.79 0.89 0.98
one3 one2 0.92 0.95 0.76 0.82 0.49 0.79 0.83 0.95
two2 two4 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.91 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.89
two1 two4 1 0.72 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.71 0.71 0.80
four4 four2 0.91 0.95 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.65 0.70 0.79
four2 four2 0.78 1 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.73 0.83
three1 three3 0.76 0.98 0.92 0.83 0.75 1 0.65 0.77
three2 three3 0.89 0.92 0.91 1 0.59 0.84 0.64 0.76
one1 two2 0.78 0.19 0.81 0.45 0.47 0.38 0.59 0.42
one1 ﬁve3 0.55 0.18 0.76 0.39 0.46 0.21 0.42 0.45
one1 six1 0.61 0.26 0.80 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.64
three1 seven2 0.60 0.12 0.57 0.52 0.82 0.59 0.39 0.55
three1 ﬁve2 0.68 0.24 0.58 0.53 0.59 0.69 0.35 0.65
two1 six2 055 0.14 0.57 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.63 0.61
two1 three1 0.56 0.29 0.54 0.18 0.41 0.19 0.64 0.64
ﬁve1 six1 0.69 0.23 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.39 0.65 0.63
two2 three2 0.65 0.25 0.79 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.65 0.52
two2 one1 0.62 0.26 0.75 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.53
one1 four1 0.66 0.18 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.19 0.42 0.43
two2 seven1 0.59 0.31 0.62 0.47 0.50 0.21 0.49 0.44
two3 six2 0.58 0.14 0.68 0.49 0.51 0.23 0.51 0.58
four2 one1 0.76 0.19 0.48 0.51 0.41 0.18 0.69 0.32
four2 ﬁve1 0.75 0.10 0.49 0.34 0.52 0.17 0.68 0.59
seven1 one3 0.83 0.18 0.44 0.30 0.59 0.13 0.58 0.29
4. Performance Measures
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) are measured to evaluate the system performance. FAR
and FRR are deﬁned in equation 15 and 16 respectively.
FAR =
Impostor scores exceeding threshold
All impostor scores
(15)
FRR =
Genuine scores f ailing below threshold
All genuine scores
(16)
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Table 3. Performance measures
Performance measures AES RSA
MFCC PLP MFCC PLP
SIP SLS SIP SLS SIP SLS SIP SLS
FAR 0.31 0 0.19 0 0.31 0.06 0.38 0
FRR 0.13 0 0.31 0 0.06 0.06 0.13 0
5. Implementation
The implementation is done in MATLAB R2014a. The MFCC and PLP features are extracted from speech signal.
Then encoded using PCM, then the arbitrary length binary data is converted into 128 bit data by using MD5 hash
function. Then the 128 bit feature is encrypted using AES and RSA cryptosystems. Then correlation between cipher
speeches are measured using the secure inner product and secure log sum protocols.
6. Simulation Results and Discussions
Here we implement a secure speech authentication system. The extracted features from diﬀerent speech samples
are encrypted. This includes speech samples of diﬀerent speakers spoken at diﬀerent tones. In Table 2. the speech
sample one1 and one2 corresponds to same speech (Malayalam digit one) spoken at diﬀerent tones. Table 2. shows
the experimental results of diﬀerent encrypted speech samples whose MFCC and PLP features are encrypted using
AES and RSA separately and authentication done using SIP and SLS protocols.
The results shown here are normalized SIP and SLS scores. From the obtained results, we can clearly observe
that the scores obtained by SLS protocols is the best irrespective of the encryption scheme and feature selection. The
scores corresponding to positive acceptance stand above the threshold and the scores corresponding to rejection fall
far below the threshold. Performance evaluation of the system using FAR and FRR scores is depicted in Table 3.
From the results it is observed that SLS protocol performs well for both AES and RSA and for any feature chosen as
well.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a privacy preserving speech authentication system. We used MFCC and PLP to
extract features from the speech. Secure inner product and secure log sum signal processing primitives were used to
implement the proposed system, where these primitives were applied to encrypted features of speech data, encryption
where done using AES and RSA schemes. Experimental results show that secure log sum outperforms secure inner
product for speech authentication system irrespective of the feature chosen and the encryption schemes.
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